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ABSTRACT 
Social scientists studying natural disasters have generally found an 
absence of panic, a decrease in crime, and survivors working together to 
find basic necessities in the days and weeks after a catastrophe. By 
contrast, political and military authorities implement measures such as 
martial law to prevent chaos and lawlessness threatening private property. 
The media amplifies narratives of disorder, creating the perception of 
uncontrolled masses wantonly committing crimes in a disaster’s aftermath. 
Historians study natural disasters to view political, social, economic, and 
cultural structures stripped of their everyday veneer. The 1861 earthquake 
that destroyed the provincial capital of Mendoza in western Argentina 
provides an opportunity to examine narratives of disorder in newspapers 
and in survivor accounts that highlighted rampant looting and attributed 
these actions to rural peoples and the popular masses. Reports from the 
earthquake’s aftermath reflected the political conflicts between the 
hegemonic urban center of Buenos Aires and the interior provinces of 
Argentina, as well as the social divisions between urban elites and the 
lower classes. Judicial and criminal records from Mendoza, however, 
showed a decrease in crime after the earthquake, as well as rates of theft 
and robbery similar to those before the catastrophe, contradicting popular 
accounts of pervasive lawlessness. 
KEY WORDS  Natural Disasters; Crime; Elite Panic; Media; Society; Government; 
Argentina 
 
∗ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Quinn P. Dauer, School of Social 
Sciences, Indiana University Southeast, 4201 Grant Line Road, New Albany, IN  47150; 
qdauer@ius.edu. 
The research and writing of this article have been generously funded by a Tinker grant, 
Florida International University (FIU) Graduate School Dissertation Evidence Acquisition 
Fellowship, FIU Graduate School Dissertation Year Fellowship, IU Southeast’s Research Support 
Program Grant, and IU Southeast Summer Faculty Fellowship. 
1
Dauer: Natural Disaster, Crime, and Narratives of Disorder: The 1861 Men
2  Midwest Social Sciences Journal  Vol. 22 (2019) 
On the evening of March 20, 1861, Maunday Thursday of Holy Week, an earthquake 
destroyed the city of Mendoza, an important entrepôt between Buenos Aires and Chile 
that was nestled in foothills of the Andes mountains in western Argentina. In the days and 
weeks after the temblor, newspapers, especially those in Buenos Aires, reported that 
Mendoza had descended into chaos in the earthquake’s aftermath. Looters from the 
countryside and the urban lower classes allegedly took advantage of the catastrophe to 
enrich themselves by appropriating private property and raiding ruined provincial towns 
and villages as well as the destroyed provincial capital city. The authorities responded to 
the earthquake by declaring martial law and implementing measures to maintain order 
and protect private property, announcing that anyone caught looting among the ruins 
would be summarily shot. Country people pillaging the ruins of Mendoza played a 
prominent role in newspaper reports and survivor accounts of the natural disaster. Despite 
the dominant narrative of rural peoples engaging in antisocial behavior such as looting 
the ruins of Mendoza, provincial judicial and criminal records reveal that crime registered 
after the earthquake decreased and that rates of theft and robbery remained at predisaster 
levels. Survivor accounts noted that many residents worked together to find potable 
water, food, and materials to construct temporary shelters rather than pillaging the ruins 
for valuables. 
DISASTER STUDIES 
Natural disasters often conjure up images of chaos, lawlessness, disorder, and a loss of 
control. Elites fear and often assume that a disaster unleashes a wave of looting and 
antisocial behavior that threatens the social and political order; thus, authorities view 
catastrophes as dangerous situations that require swift and severe sanctions to prevent and 
deter any disorder and to ensure the sanctity of private property. In their zeal to maintain 
order and stop social unrest, as a deterrent to curb looting and general disorder, political 
elites and military officials often enact martial law after a disaster and allow summary 
executions of survivors assumed to be looting. Sociologists, psychologists, 
anthropologists, political scientists, and other social scientists who study catastrophes, 
however, have noted a lack of widespread antisocial behavior in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster. According to scholars of disasters, the authorities and elites use their 
resources to protect private property and ensure their political legitimacy as the media 
reproduce standard tropes of chaos and disorder. The foundational works in the field of 
disaster studies by sociologists found, in general, an absence of panic, reduced levels of 
crime such as looting, and prosocial behavior among survivors after a catastrophe, 
contrary to the assumptions that influence governments’ disaster and emergency 
responses (Fritz 1966; Quarantelli and Dynes 1970; Quarantelli and Dynes 1972). 
Sociologists have given the label “elite panic” to the “fear of social disorder; fear 
of poor, minorities and immigrants; obsession with looting and property crime; 
willingness to resort to deadly force; and actions taken on the basis of rumor” after a 
natural disaster (Solnit 2009:127). Looting is often overstated in the immediate days after 
a natural disaster as survivors sifting through the rubble are looking for food, potable 
water, and materials with which to build shelter from the elements rather than looking to 
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profit from catastrophe. Rebecca Solnit observes that the term “looting conflates the 
emergency requisitioning of supplies in a crisis without a cash economy with 
opportunistic stealing” (2009:37). In contrast to popular assumptions, the social order 
does not break down in the aftermath of a natural disaster; instead, therapeutic or 
extraordinary communities are formed, characterized by survivors working together to 
fulfill immediate needs such as food, potable water, clothing, and shelter. Drawing on 
academic studies, Solnit argues that extraordinary communities emerge as most people in 
the affected locality engage in spontaneous altruistic acts to help one another amid 
devastation and destruction. 
Sociologists have analyzed narratives and popular images of panic, disorder, and 
rampant looting that have been reproduced and disseminated in the media after natural 
disasters. For example, after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, the print 
media and television emphasized common disaster narratives of rampant looting, 
antisocial behavior, and widespread criminal activity carried out by survivors in the 
absence of law and order. Furthermore, according to many media accounts, rather than 
forming an extraordinary community, Katrina survivors epitomized examples of selfish 
and greedy behavior that occurs when humans are freed from legal and moral constraints. 
Media narratives often reproduced elites’ racial and class assumptions. Analyzing the 
narratives in the print media and television news reports, sociologists have found the 
narratives often based on assumptions, rumor, and hearsay. The media attributed 
lawlessness, looting, and antisocial behavior to poor, working-class, and minority groups, 
especially African Americans. Furthermore, the narratives of lawlessness and of New 
Orleans as a “war zone” that were disseminated by the media justified the use of force 
and a militaristic response in the weeks after the hurricane (Dynes and Rodríquez 2010; 
Tierney and Bevc 2010; Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006). 
Examples of antisocial behavior and looting do exist after catastrophes, 
particularly during civil unrest such as urban riots. When looting does occur after natural 
disasters, such as in Saint Croix after Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, it often reflects social conditions and crime rates before the 
disaster. Sociologists studying Hurricane Hugo found that widespread looting occurred 
on only Saint Croix rather than other affected Caribbean islands. They argued that the 
looting was based on the scale of damage for the entire island, the inability of the state to 
carry out a rescue-and-relief effort, and survivors not knowing when help would arrive. 
Finally, the sociologists pointed to socioeconomic inequalities and racial acrimony that 
existed before the disaster that were exacerbated after the hurricane and led to antisocial 
behavior (Rodríquez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006). Likewise, after Hurricane Katrina, 
crime rates increased, but they did so within the context of the vast socioeconomic and 
racial disparities in New Orleans (Frailing and Wood Harper 2010). 
Historians have begun to study disasters, scouring archives and libraries to 
understand how states and societies have responded to catastrophes in different historical 
periods and contexts. Historians studying natural disasters in Latin America argue that 
catastrophes strip away the façade that covers social-economic, political, and cultural 
structures, allowing scholars to analyze relationships and hierarchies of power (Buchenau 
and Johnson 2009:4). Furthermore, Charles Walker observes that “natural disasters bring 
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to the surface both old and new tensions and offer vivid insights into society” (2003:57). 
For example, the Lima earthquake of 1746 highlighted how the disaster magnified 
existing social, political, and religious conflicts within Peruvian society and throughout 
the Spanish Empire (Walker 2008). Similarly, social and economic fault lines also 
ruptured in Chile after the Valparaíso earthquake in 1906. Chilean authorities already 
concerned with strikes and protests among the working class in the country’s main port 
city feared a general social uprising after the 1906 temblor; thus, the government declared 
martial law and harshly cracked down on any real or perceived criminal behavior. The 
police and military used markers of class, such as dress and language, to determine who 
was looting and who was merely picking through the rubble of their homes. The residents 
of Valparaíso, however, also formed extraordinary communities. Survivor accounts 
highlighted social leveling as rich and poor worked together to find food, help the 
injured, provide basic services, and rebuild the city in the days after the earthquake 
(Martland 2009). 
Likewise, the 1861 Mendoza earthquake reflected social and political divisions 
within 19th-century Argentina. Newspaper reports, survivor accounts, and official 
documents focused on the damage to elite property and emphasized concerns about 
looting by the poor and rural peoples. Similarly, the political divisions between the 
interior provinces and Buenos Aires and between federals and liberals colored narratives 
about the provincial government’s response to the disaster, relief efforts, and protection 
of private property. 
SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN 19TH-CENTURY ARGENTINA 
The Mendoza earthquake of March 20, 1861, occurred at a critical juncture in Argentine 
history. The fall of the national caudillo (strongman) Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1852 
plunged Argentina into a civil war, with the interior provinces of the Argentine 
Confederation forming one side and the hegemonic urban center, Buenos Aires, forming 
the other. Nineteenth-century Argentine liberals celebrated the demise of Rosas and 
hoped that the strongman rule that was endemic to the interior provinces and to Argentina 
more generally could finally be broken under the leadership of Buenos Aires. Liberals, 
mostly drawn from the upper classes or the wealthy urban merchant class, desired to 
unify the country under a strong central government emanating from Buenos Aires. By 
contrast, federalists from the interior provinces desired autonomy and resented attempts 
by Buenos Aires to install centralized rule. Caudillos often allied themselves with 
federalists, who favored provincial autonomy, and were supported by gauchos 
(cowboys), campesinos (rural laborers), the poor, and popular masses through client and 
patron networks. The conflict between the hegemonic port city and the interior provinces 
reached a climax at the battle of Pavón in September 1861, when Buenos Aires defeated 
the Argentine Confederation. By the end of 1861, Buenos Aires troops began to occupy 
and pacify the interior provinces, particularly in the west of the country, which was a 
stronghold of federalism, including Mendoza. 
The political divisions between Buenos Aires and liberals and between the 
interior provinces and federalists, as well as social divisions between elites and 
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businessmen, on the one hand, and gauchos, campesinos, and urban lower classes, on the 
other, were echoed in survivor accounts, chronicles of the disaster, and newspaper 
articles and editorials about the March 20, 1861, earthquake that destroyed Mendoza. 
Accounts of the days and weeks after the disaster described marauding hordes of gauchos 
and campesinos from the countryside looting and pillaging the province’s capital city. 
Furthermore, the governor’s failure to maintain law and order in Mendoza after the 
catastrophe demonstrated the failures of federalism, according to accounts of the disaster 
in the liberal Buenos Aires press. Newspapers reports and survivor accounts highlighted 
heroic behavior by the elites and the “honorable men” of Mendoza in the disaster’s 
aftermath. The social and political divides within 19th-century Argentina were thus 
reflected in the accounts and narratives about crime and disorder in the days, weeks, and 
months after the earthquake. 
ACOUNTS OF LOOTING AND ELITE PANIC 
Newspapers published reports and firsthand accounts describing and lamenting the 
widespread looting of Mendoza. El Imparcial, a newspaper from the interior province of 
Córdoba, published an article with the headline “A Party of Vampires” on April 5, 
1861,detailing a putrid scene of corpses decaying and perfuming the rubble and of people 
overcome with “greed for gold,”1 (Suárez 1938e:299).2 The account proclaimed that 
looters removed everything of value they could find on the rotting corpses they 
uncovered as they picked through the rubble and “laughed at the pain that they do not 
understand, to take a bit of gold, albeit tinged with blood!” (Suárez 1938e:300). The 
report concluded with the observation that Mendoza had fallen into the hands of 
criminals who had come “to exploit the great ossuary!” (Suárez 1938e:300). 
Accounts of the earthquake and its aftermath often exhibited elite panic as the 
upper classes blamed the lower orders of society, often gauchos and campesinos, for 
criminal activity and malevolent behavior. A liberal Buenos Aires newspaper, La 
Tribuna, published on April 14, 1861, a survivor’s account of “Daily Observations,” 
which chronicled the first ten days after the earthquake. The entry for March 22, two days 
after the earthquake, observed that bands of campesinos arrived in the provincial capital 
with tools, supposedly to pick through the rubble to loot. Although some country people 
traveled to Mendoza to help by providing aid to the earthquake survivors, pulling people 
from the rubble and also recovering and burying the dead, others had nefarious motives: 
to use their tools to pick through the ruins “to discover booty” (Suárez 1938c:122). 
Wenceslao Díaz, a Chilean scientist and doctor, was part of the medical commission sent 
to Mendoza after the earthquake as part of a relief effort by Chile. His scientific and 
medical report on the 1861 catastrophe included observations on the social conditions and 
highlighted the lack of law and order in the days and weeks after the catastrophe. Díaz 
wrote that gauchos and campesinos ignored the cries of victims trapped beneath the ruins 
of buildings and instead stole the victims’ goods, possessions, or anything of value that 
they could uncover. He also reported that some of the looters took pity on residents 
buried under the rubble but charged them a fee to be extricated from the ruins. According 
to the Chilean doctor, rather than help with the community’s rescue and relief efforts, the 
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looters refused to even help clear the streets of debris (Díaz 1907:30). In a letter dated 
March 27, 1861, earthquake survivor Eugenio Menéndez wrote in a letter to his friend 
Jacinto Corvalán, in the city of Rosario, that after the earthquake, the gauchos from the 
surrounding countryside invaded the city, terrorized the population, and ran off with as 
much loot as “their horses and mules could carry” (Suárez 1938a:195). In his account of 
the catastrophe, prominent politician Eusebio Blanco (1936), who played a central role in 
the rebuilding of the provincial capital in the years after the earthquake, also noted that 
people from outside the city began to arrive in Mendoza in the days after the earthquake. 
According to Blanco, bands of marauders reportedly helped to free prisoners trapped in 
jails and then stole anything of value they could find in the rubble without paying any 
respect to the bodies of the dead. 
Narratives of the disaster included stereotypes of traits associated with scavenging 
animals to describe the country peoples’ motives and behavior after the earthquake. For 
example, Díaz compared the gauchos and campesinos to bands of “jackals” and “crows” 
(1907:30). Blanco compared the bands of marauders to birds of the plains that descend to 
earth when they see a dead animal, to devour it (1936:191). Another account of the 
catastrophe, this one by A. Clereaux (1938), observed that gauchos and campesinos also 
reportedly descended on the provincial capital to loot the ruins. Similar to Díaz and 
Blanco, Clereaux also compared the accused looters from the countryside to animals, 
describing them as “hungry jackals” and “bands of outlaws” that systematically and 
extensively pillaged Mendoza for five days after the earthquake in the absence of the 
authorities, not frightened by the aftershocks that continued to shake the earth 
(1938:161). 
Urban masses were likewise identified as looters and criminals. In a letter to a 
friend dated March 30, 1861, a person identified by the initials R. J. R. wrote that the 
worst part of the catastrophe was “the looting and general robbing,” blaming the rampant 
crime on “the plebe,” who scavenged and picked through the ruins of businesses and 
targeted the upper classes’ houses such as his for pilfering (Suárez 1938b:198). 
The Chilean doctor, Díaz, asserted that the lower orders took advantage of the 
disaster situation as a means to target elites. Quoting the looters, he wrote that the lower 
classes believed that “the misfortune, they said, was for the rich” (Díaz 1907:30–31). The 
scientist and medical doctor portrayed the popular masses as uncaring and immoral 
people interested only in taking what was not theirs. Even the violent shaking of the earth 
did not scare the lower classes enough to deter them from engaging in antisocial 
behavior; instead, they ignored the cries of the injured and dying, neglected the relief 
efforts, and focused only on enriching themselves through looting. In his description of 
the lower classes’ actions after the earthquake, Díaz wrote, “Only pillage and rapine 
occupied those hands with harpy claws” (1907:31). The doctor went on to assert that 
popular masses engaged in “thievery and sacrilege when the foundations of the world 
were shaken!” (1907:31). 
Clereaux’s chronicle of the disaster also observed that the popular masses used 
the disaster as a means to exact retribution. He noted, “These cannibals reach out their 
hands to the unfortunates, who ask them for help getting up [from the ruins and rubble of 
Mendoza], not to help them in effect, but to strip the virgin of her rings and earrings and 
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the rich man’s watch and money” (1938:161). Manuel Blancas, the president of the 
Buenos Aires Medical Commission, wrote in his account of the earthquake published in 
La Tribuna on May 7, 1861, that in addition to the earthquake and fire, “the plebe 
practiced robbery” (Suárez 1938g:254). For Díaz, the elites were the only social group 
that acted honorably after the earthquake. The noted scientist characterized the lower 
classes as concerned only with looting the properties of the upper classes, although, 
“there were, however, honorable exceptions among the enlightened people” (Díaz 
1907:31). 
Crime occurred with impunity, unchecked by the authorities, according to reports 
and accounts from Mendoza in the days and weeks after the earthquake. For Díaz, the 
worst part of catastrophe was not the fire that broke out on March 24 and engulfed the 
ruins; instead, “the looting, the most stupid vandalism, the most inhuman indolence soon 
came to be the worst plague that followed the catastrophe” (1907:30). Instead of helping 
the trapped, injured, and dying victims of the disaster, the marauders from the 
countryside reportedly stripped them of their valuables, according to Clereaux’s chronicle 
of the catastrophe. He observed, “Nothing escapes their plunder,” and that neither the 
continued trembling of the earth or the cries of suffering from the dying affected them, 
that only “vice and immorality moved their depraved souls” (Clereaux 1938:161). 
Survivor accounts, letters, and newspaper reports noted the impunity with which the 
looting of the ruins took place. The March 23 and 25 entries from the “daily 
observations” in one survivor’s journal simply noted, “The looting continues,” and the 
March 27 entry stated, “Looting continued in the rest of the city” (Suárez 1938c:123–
124, 126). 
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE 
Argentine newspapers assigned blame for the disorder in Mendoza after the earthquake. 
A civil war between Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederation racked the country 
when the temblor destroyed Mendoza. The Buenos Aires press attributed the lack of law 
and order in Mendoza to the federalist provincial government, especially to Governor 
Laureano Nazar’s tepid response to the disaster and abandonment of his responsibilities 
as the leading provincial official. 
The frequent aftershocks added to the terror in the days after the temblor, and fire 
raged through the ruined city as municipal and provincial officials either were absent or 
scrambled to respond (Suárez 1938c:121–128). The “daily observations” of one survivor 
included an entry for the day after the earthquake, which noted that when the flames rose, 
engulfing the rubble and ruins of houses and business, no authorities could be found as 
“disorder and confusion” reigned in the streets and plazas throughout the city (Suárez 
1938c:121). On March 22, two days after the earthquake, this survivor wrote that people 
from the countryside arrived in Mendoza, mostly to pillage and loot the ruins as the fire 
spread throughout the destroyed city with increasing intensity. The dead began to putrefy 
beneath the rubble, but the authorities did not take any action to extinguish the fire, stop 
the looting, or bury the dead to stop a potential public health crisis (Suárez 1938c:122). 
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Food and potable water were in short supply in Mendoza after the earthquake. On 
March 23, three days after the seismic shock, Governor Nazar ordered three cattle 
slaughtered and distributed to the people taking refuge in the main square. On the fourth 
day, the governor ordered that any remaining cattle be slaughtered and distributed to the 
survivors. Potable water could be found only at a great distance from the provincial 
capital (Suárez 1938c:122–123). 
One account connected antisocial behavior with increasing desperation among 
survivors left to fend for themselves in the absence of a concerted government response. 
A letter from a disaster survivor published in El Imparcial noted that the author had 
“witnessed people stealing and looting” and lamented the lack of humanity found in 
Mendoza because he had not seen anyone helping to pull the injured or dead still trapped 
beneath the rubble of their houses, businesses, and churches (Suárez 1938e:305). At the 
end of the letter, in the same paragraph noting the lawlessness and lack of humanity in 
the city after the earthquake, the writer connected looting and selfish behavior with the 
shortage of provisions and desperation, concluding, “Here there is no more meat or water, 
but no one thinks about eating or drinking” (p. 305). 
After emerging from the rubble, survivors took refuge under trees in Mendoza’s 
main plaza before moving away from the city’s center. The provincial government 
moved very slowly in helping to provide relief or organize shelter. Manuel Blancas, the 
head of the Buenos Aires Medical Commission, in an April 25, 1861, letter to Bartolomé 
Mitre, the leader of Buenos Aires, published in La Tribuna on May 7, 1861, wrote that 
the survivors had initially taken refuge beneath trees or tents but that only at the end of 
April, a month after the earthquake, had hastily built temporary shelters been constructed 
to provide protection for the injured in need of medical attention (Suárez 1938g:255). 
At the beginning of April, survivors gradually moved from the main plaza to the 
hacienda San Nicolás, which was to the southwest of the city center. There, they were 
still able to use the rubble from the destroyed city to build temporary constructions, and 
public officials began to organize relief efforts and distribute aid from Chile, neighboring 
provinces, and Buenos Aires (Scobie 1988:113). 
The failure of the provincial government to respond to the earthquake by 
maintaining order or providing relief to survivors was largely blamed on the federalist 
governor. Nine days after the earthquake, Governor Nazar withdrew from the provincial 
capital to his country estate at Tres Acequias (Suárez 1938c:125). Buenos Aires 
newspapers were outraged that Nazar had abandoned the city and allowed Mendoza to 
descend into disorder and lawlessness. According to an article published in El Nacional 
on April 15, after five days of complete inaction, Nazar’s abandonment of the provincial 
capital and his responsibilities left the city free for nefarious individuals to plunder and 
pillage the ruins of Mendoza (Suárez 1938f). The earthquake survivors gathered under 
the large trees in the main plaza and later at San Nicolás. There, the property owners and 
merchants of the city gathered to address the absence of Nazar, law enforcement, and a 
relief effort (Suárez 1938f:280–281). An April 15 report in El Nacional noted that the 
new governing elites’ objective was to restore order to a city engulfed in “this chaos of 
pain and suffering” (p. 281). 
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PROTECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY 
The earthquake destroyed police and infantry stations in Mendoza, killing police and 
infantrymen. The lack of law enforcement officials and rank-and-file infantrymen made 
enforcing order and protecting private property difficult. Miltón González del Solar, a 
doctor who led the Argentine Confederation’s medical commission to Mendoza, included 
in his records a death toll, with names of the deceased, if they were known, and the 
location where bodies were found. His toll included the majority of the city’s prisoners, 
along with 14 soldiers dead at the city jail; 20 soldiers dead and many others injured at 
the infantry garrison; and approximately 100 prisoners and guards dead at another 
garrison (González del Solar 1938:220). 
The lack of police and infantrymen was a central concern for the authorities, who 
organized informal groups from among the earthquake survivors to provide security and 
protect private property from looters. In the absence of the governor after the earthquake, 
two military men, Manuel J. Olascoaga and Juan de Dios Videla, took charge and began 
to organize relief efforts and maintain order with scant resources. Olascoaga organized 
and led a group of young men to protect private property and maintain order by shooting 
anyone caught looting and plundering the ruins and rubble without compassion (Scalvini 
1965:258). Videla helped create informal groups that provided security and guarded 
private property, especially in the parts of the city where survivors had taken refuge. 
According to the March 29 entry in a survivor’s “daily observations,” the watch groups 
proved successful in impeding looting and pillaging in much of the city and surrounding 
suburbs, but in other parts of Mendoza, the plundering continued unabated (Suárez 
1938c). El Nacional reported on April 1 that an infantry squad had been mobilized to 
ensure order, protect valuables covered in dust and rubble, and protect widows and 
orphans (Suárez 1938f:259). During its session on March 23, the legislature from the 
neighboring province of San Juan authorized the governor to mobilize and send men and 
resources to restore order and protect private property in Mendoza (Suárez 1938d:378). 
In Mendoza, the authorities attempted to protect private property from looters and 
thieves by regulating who could enter the destroyed city center. In cities throughout Latin 
America, elites and merchants maintained residences and businesses near the main plaza, 
where government buildings and churches anchored society and daily life. Anything of 
value was buried beneath the ruins and rubble in the city center and along the Alameda, 
the main street of Mendoza. On March 23, the provincial authorities prohibited all people 
except the police from entering the destroyed city center from Sauce de la Cañada in the 
north to the Plaza Nueva in the south and from the Zanjón, a canal that ran along the east 
side of the provincial capital, to the Tajamar, an irrigation canal located on higher ground 
to the west. Anyone found in the prohibited area would be assumed to be a looter and 
shot on the spot. Residents who needed to enter the destroyed city could apply for and 
receive a pass from the police that stated the names of the property owner and those who 
accompanied him (Rejistro oficial 1877:135). 
Earthquake survivors migrated to the neighboring provinces of San Juan and San 
Luis, bringing any possessions they could carry with them. According to an article in El 
Imparcial published on April 3, earthquake survivors fled Mendoza because of continued 
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strong aftershocks, the fear of looting, and the threat of disease from the decaying and 
putrefying bodies, and the government of San Luis provided transportation to protect 
migrants’ possessions (Suárez 1938e:290). 
The government and citizens from the neighboring province of San Juan were 
among the first to respond after the earthquake. Several wealthy men from San Juan 
provided carriages for transporting families and other resources for the earthquake 
victims. The caravan returned to San Juan, dropping off the earthquake survivors and 
then gathering more resources to take back to Mendoza. The provincial government of 
San Juan also sent a wagon train to provide security to survivors and protect their goods 
during transit. In addition, San Juan’s legislature approved a sum of 10,000 pesos for the 
protection of the migrants from Mendoza. On March 25, the first carriages arrived in 
Mendoza from San Juan, bringing aid for the injured and transporting some families back 
to San Juan. The following day, more families lined up in hopes of finding a spot on the 
wagon train to San Juan. One earthquake survivor expressed their appreciation for the 
help from the neighboring province, stating, “We owe a lot to our neighbors of San Juan” 
(Suárez 1938c:124). In a letter to Jacinto Corvalán dated March 24, 1861, Eugenio 
Menéndez wrote of the desperation of the survivors to escape Mendoza because of the 
sickening smell of decaying bodies and the lack of food, reporting that residents of the 
provincial capital dug out what few possessions they could from the rubble and made the 
journey to San Juan by whatever means available (Suárez 1938a:195). 
The mass exodus of earthquake survivors, however, made ensuring the integrity 
of private property difficult. At the beginning of April, the provincial authorities decreed 
that in the interest of quelling disorder and maintaining the public good, measures needed 
to be taken to guarantee private property and the possessions left behind by the migrating 
earthquake survivors. The acting provincial authorities issued a law that prevented 
migration out of the province without a passport. Residents who needed passports could 
obtain the documents from the police chiefs in the areas of city where they resided. The 
police issued residents tickets that included information about the resident’s property, 
recording the number of people leaving, the branding mark on any animals, valuables the 
residents were carrying, and certification that the property they were taking was in fact 
legitimately theirs. The authorities declared migrants without proper documentation to be 
thieves subject to criminal laws regarding possession of stolen property (Rejistro oficial, 
1877:137–138). Despite the official decrees and the legal attempts to determine and 
maintain the proper ownership of property, however, authorities continued to struggle to 
ascertain the legitimate holders of animals, possessions, and goods leaving Mendoza with 
migrants and those still buried beneath the rubble. 
Trying to end the confusion over property ownership, provincial and municipal 
authorities issued further regulations. As the earthquake had reduced Mendoza to a pile of 
rubble that contained putrefying corpses and worldly belongings, property and goods 
were left buried beneath the rubble of homes and businesses either because residents died 
or emigrated. Furthermore, with all of the city’s buildings lying in ruins, having collapsed 
onto one another, it was unclear where one property ended and another began. Property 
owners who returned or stayed to pick through the debris of their homes and businesses 
often ended up with their neighbors’ possessions. In the confusion, it was difficult for the 
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authorities and those picking through the rubble to determine who owned the goods dug 
out from the ruins. Furthermore, provincial authorities asserted that ill-willed people had 
taken advantage of the chaotic situation to loot. 
To control the situation, the provincial authorities appointed a citizens 
commission to record the possessions left behind by the migrants. During the second 
week of May 1861, the provincial authorities declared that anyone with goods that did 
not belong to them should turn them into the citizen’s commission within eight days to 
avoid being charged with a felony or another crime. Dubiously owned or possessed items 
could be dropped off at a police station for inspection. The house of anyone denounced 
for or accused of harboring stolen merchandise or goods was placed on a list and the 
objects in question were turned over to the citizens commission until the legitimate owner 
could be determined (Rejistro oficial, 1877:142–144). 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, police collected stolen or misappropriated 
items, but many owners did not return to claim their possessions. In June 1861, the 
provincial courts required that all stolen or misappropriated property be held in police 
custody until claimed by the rightful owner. If no one claimed the items after a waiting 
period, the goods were considered public property and sold at auction. The authorities 
compiled and published a list of 315 items to be claimed by their rightful owners. Among 
the valuables collected were merchandise, jewelry, clothing, and home furnishings. In 
December 1861, four groups of unclaimed goods were auctioned. The first batch of 
goods was worth an estimated 83.89 pesos; the second lot required 82.03 pesos to 
purchase; the third assortment of goods was valued at 83.15 pesos; and the fourth passel 
of items was appraised at 82.50 pesos (AHPM 1861c). The ambiguity in determining the 
owners of items buried beneath the ruins and rubble of Mendoza also complicated the 
narratives of endemic looting found in survivor accounts and newspapers, especially 
when compared to crime rates tabulated from provincial criminal and judicial records. 
CRIMINAL AND JUDICIAL RECORDS OF THE PROVINCE OF MENDOZA 
Immediately after the earthquake on March 20, 1861, few specific incidents of crime 
were reported or recorded. Accounts from Mendoza published in newspapers throughout 
Argentina in the days and weeks after the earthquake generally referred to widespread 
looting and pillaging carried out by campesinos, gauchos, and the urban lower classes. 
Survivor accounts and newspaper reports, however, included few specific examples of 
disorder and criminal activity. In an effort to maintain law and order and to ensure the 
sanctity of private property, the provincial authorities announced on March 25, five days 
after the earthquake, that anyone caught looting the ruins of Mendoza would be 
summarily shot. The next day, according to one eyewitness’s “daily observations,” four 
“marauders” were pulled from the rubble of the provincial capital and executed, and two 
more looters were shot without any legal recourse or process in the department of San 
Vincente (Suárez 1938c:125). The liberal Buenos Aires press, however, did not judge 
every attempt at the enforcement of martial law and summary executions as legitimate or 
necessary for restoring order. An article published in El Nacional on April 17 decried 
federalist Governor Nazar’s autocratic and arbitrary actions in Mendoza after the 
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earthquake. According to the report, before he fled the provincial capital, Nazar ordered 
the execution of a group of earthquake survivors who had petitioned to leave the province 
and denied any wrongdoing. Before the judgment could be carried out, Juan de Dios 
Videla took charge of the province in the absence of Governor Nazar, who had retreated 
to his country estate, and halted their imminent executions, becoming a hero in the pages 
of the liberal Buenos Aires press (Suárez 1938f:281). 
Despite the provincial and municipal authorities issuing regulations to ensure the 
legitimate ownership of animals, possessions, and goods leaving the province with 
migrants, thieves were able to leave Mendoza with stolen items. Looters who had taken 
property from the rubble of Mendoza were later apprehended in other Argentine 
provinces. A newspaper in Córdoba, El Imparcial, reported on April 3 that the previous 
evening, the authorities had stopped Francisco Navarro, a “peon” and soldier, who told 
the authorities that he had come from Mendoza, where he had participated in the looting 
of the destroyed capital. In Navarro’s possession, the police had found a silver watch, a 
chain with three gold clips, a gold ring, three pesos, earrings made from French gold, a 
silver pigeon that adorned a mate cup and an accompanying straw, and three reals of 
stamped silver (Suárez 1938e:300). Similarly, a soldier fled Mendoza in July 1861 with 
some of the recovered property that the citizens commission had collected that was either 
unclaimed, misappropriated, or stolen (AHPM 1861c). After the city of Mendoza moved 
to a new location, the ruins and rubble of the old city still provided opportunities for 
looters. During the winter of 1864, the police caught a man looting the ruins of the Iglesia 
Matriz, near the main plaza of the old city. The thief had confiscated a silver crown and 
various pieces of wood from the ruins of the church (AHPM 1864). 
Table 1. Crimes per Month in the Province of Mendoza during 1861 













Notes: Table is based on judicial and criminal records for the Mendoza Province from the Sección 
Justicia y Criminal, Epoca Independiente, Archivo Historico de la Provincia de Mendoza. 
ª Crimes registered during the month of March occurred before the earthquake on March 20, 1861. 
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Survivor accounts and newspaper descriptions of rampant looting in the days and 
weeks after the earthquake were not reflected in the criminal and judicial records for the 
Province of Mendoza. No crimes were registered after the earthquake in March, and only 
two were noted during the month of April 1861 (Table 1). All criminal activity registered 
during March in the criminal judicial records of Mendoza occurred before the earthquake 
on March 20, 1861. The absence of registered crime during the last eleven days of March 
could be due to the difficulty of keeping formal records, because earthquake survivors 
more concerned about finding clothing, food, and potable water and with constructing 
shelter, and because government resources were absent or were slow to respond. 
Likewise, official government documents had to be recovered from the ruins of 
government buildings, demonstrating the difficulty of record keeping in the days and 
weeks after the catastrophe. Indeed, the chief of police in July 1861 enlisted prisoners to 
search for and extract documents missing in the rubble resulting from the earthquake 
(AHPM 1861c). 
Table 2. Robberies and Thefts Annually in Mendoza Province, 1858–1864 
Year Animals Money Possessions Generala Total 
1858 16 0 3 16 35 
1859 9 2 1 16 28 
1860 27 6 18 17 68 
1861 5 8 12 10 35 
1862 12 3 8 14 37 
1863 8 4 4 11 27 
1864 18 4 11 20 53 
Notes: Table based on judicial and criminal records for the Province of Mendoza from the Sección 
Justicia y Criminal, Epoca Independiente, Archivo Historico de la Provincia de Mendoza. 
ª “General” refers to robberies and thefts not accompanied by annotation in the archive’s indices or 
case description noting the type of object(s) stolen. 
Crime rates based on the criminal and judicial records from the province of 
Mendoza initially decreased in the days, weeks, and months after the earthquake and 
generally reflected predisaster levels in the years after the catastrophe. The two crimes 
registered in the judicial and criminal records for Mendoza during April 1861 were 
robberies. The police apprehended one criminal who had stolen a pair of stirrups for a 
horse and pocketed 70 pesos and another thief who had taken animals (AHPM April 
1861a,b ). In May, criminal activity returned to predisaster levels, with seven crimes 
registered, of which five were categorized as robberies and one labeled a suspected 
robbery. During June, another two robberies were cited and one case of fraud registered, 
out of a total of six cases for the month. In the winter month of July, however, crime 
ballooned to a high of twelve registered infractions, of which six were either robberies or 
thefts. Crime decreased again in August and September, with only a handful of cases. In 
October, seven cases were registered, including four labeled as robbery or theft and 
13
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another noted as suspected theft or fraud. As spring turned into summer in the Southern 
Hemisphere, crime remained low in the province of Mendoza, with three cases registered 
in the criminal and judicial records for each of the months of November and December. 
When compared to the months before the earthquake, however, criminal activity, 
including robbery and theft, was similar to that for much of the rest of the year. For 
example, out of the seven crimes entered in the criminal and judicial registry for 
February, four were robberies or thefts. In March, another seven crimes were registered, 
of which three were robberies or thefts. An examination of criminal cases in the years 
before and after earthquake shows that robberies and thefts decreased significantly in 
1861 before returning to predisaster levels (Table 2). 
Table 3. Robberies and Thefts Compared to Total Crimes Annually in Mendoza 
Province, 1858–1864 
Year Robberies/Thefts Total Crimes Robberies/Thefts 
as Percent of Total 
1858 35 107 32% 
1859 28 63 44% 
1860 68 116 58% 
1861 35 61 57% 
1862 37 78 47% 
1863 27 60 45% 
1864 53 118 44% 
Note: Table based on judicial and criminal records for the Province of Mendoza from the Sección 
Justicia y Criminal, Epoca Independiente, Archivo Historico de la Provincia de Mendoza. 
Despite authorities’ concern about possessions being stolen and then taken out of 
the province during the migration to neighboring provinces after the earthquake, and 
despite narratives of endemic looting in newspapers and survivor accounts, judicial and 
criminal records for the province of Mendoza show that the number of robberies and thefts 
in 1861 decreased by nearly half from the previous year (Table 2). Indeed, the incidence of 
the theft of animals decreased from a high of 27 cases in the year before the temblor to only 
five cases in 1861. Similarly, cases of theft of possessions decreased from 18 cases in 1860 
to 12 incidents in 1861. Likewise, cases categorized as “general theft or robbery” in the 
province’s judicial and criminal records also decreased, from 17 incidents in 1860 to 10 in 
1861. A total of 116 crimes were registered in 1860, with robberies and thefts numbering 
68, representing 58 percent of all criminal activity that year (Table 3). In 1861, the year the 
earthquake struck Mendoza, the judicial and criminal records included 61 total criminal 
cases, with 35 robberies and thefts registered, representing 57 percent of all crime for that 
year. Similarly, in 1862, 1863, and 1864, robberies and thefts as a percentage of total 
crimes reflected levels before 1860. Thus, although the reported incidence of crime 
decreased after the catastrophe, rates of robbery and theft as a percentage of the total 
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number of crimes committed annually reflected predisaster levels, belying narratives of an 
unprecedented wave of criminal activity after the earthquake in Mendoza. 
The narratives published in newspapers and recorded in survivor accounts 
described marauding bands of gauchos and campesinos pillaging and looting the ruins of 
Mendoza. Rather than an increase in crime from pre-earthquake levels after the disaster, 
which would be expected based on the firsthand accounts and newspaper reports, a 
decrease in the number of criminal cases was seen in the days, weeks, and months 
immediately after the earthquake, and all criminal activity declined in the year after the 
catastrophe. After the earthquake, theft and robbery as a percentage of the total number of 
reported crimes remained steady or at levels similar to predisaster rates. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that residents of Mendoza, rather than engaging in the reportedly 
widespread antisocial behaviors, formed extraordinary communities to help their 
neighbors and fellow citizens find food and potable water, construct shelter, and care for 
the injured in the days and weeks after the earthquake. 
AN EXTRAORDINARY COMMUNITY 
The common experience of surviving the natural disaster helped to created what scholars 
of disasters have termed extraordinary communities or therapeutic communities. In the 
“daily observations” of a survivor’s journal, the entry for the day after the earthquake 
observed that many lives had been lost because of absence of an organized government 
response. Instead, the survivors had worked together to provide aid to the injured and to 
those taking refuge underneath the trees in the city’s main plaza. The chronicler noted 
that survivors who had taken refuge in the plaza received the charity of those who passed 
through the provincial capital. Two days after the earthquake, the families who had 
helped to pull the injured from the ruins also gave any aid they could to those they saved 
(Suárez 1938c:121). In the entry for March 26, the firsthand account noted that families, 
the injured, and the sick who had taken refuge in the plaza had left and “several 
charitable neighbors have gathered in groups in neighborhoods around the city, where 
they live as a single family linked by a common misfortune” (p. 124). 
Politician Eusebio Blanco’s narrative of the catastrophe noted that survivors 
bonded through the experience of “the common misfortune” of the catastrophe. The 
earthquake struck on the evening of March 20, 1861, and witnesses recalled observing 
residents burying the dead, digging out the living from beneath the rubble, and providing 
medical care for the injured the next day as best they could with the resources they had. 
Still other survivors formed groups here and there to console each other about the great 
losses of life and property throughout the city and to find solace in their common 
religious beliefs. Indeed, Blanco (1936:191) pointed out the dire situation in the days 
after the earthquake, noting that the survivors lacked provisions, food, potable water, 
warm clothing, and shelter to protect them from the elements. 
In Mendoza after the earthquake, people engaged in acts of humanity by 
providing aid to fellow residents and outsiders, alongside antisocial behavior such as 
looting often cited in accounts of the disaster. After highlighting acts of depraved human 
indifference and looting, Félix Ferías’s chronicle of the disaster turned to acts of 
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humanity as he wrote, “Let us set aside the sight with horror of these acts of barbarism 
and recognize that they did not lack in the midst of those scenes of desolation, charitable 
souls for which treasure could not be sought under the earth more precious than the life of 
a man” ([1884] 1938:171). Similarly, Clereaux’s account of the earthquake noted that in 
the midst of such a great calamity, residents of Mendoza came together and engaged in 
“acts of the most touching charity, of self-denial, and of Christian resignation alongside 
crimes of refined perversity, to unprecedented scandals, there perpetrated sacrilegiously 
defying the wrath of God, desecrating the corpses, and the most holy of temples, and 
destroyed smoking homes” (1938:161). Indeed, often-forgotten selfless acts occurred, 
and extraordinary communities formed, solidified by the experience of the disaster, 
alongside the acts of inhumanity and depravity frequently reproduced in newspapers and 
survivor accounts of the natural disaster. 
The Mendoza earthquake of 1861 magnified the deep political and social 
divisions within 19th-century Argentina. The temblor struck the province and capital city 
at a turning point in Argentine history as Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederation 
were fighting a civil war (1852–1861). Narratives of disorder after the natural disaster in 
Mendoza found in survivor accounts and newspapers reflected the political conflicts and 
perspectives of federalists and liberals in the interior provinces and Buenos Aires. Liberal 
newspapers in Buenos Aires reported and published accounts that highlighted the 
inability of the provincial government, and particularly the federalist governor, to stop the 
chaos and looting that was endemic in the days and weeks after the catastrophe. Many 
firsthand accounts exhibited elite panic in their descriptions of marauding bands of 
gauchos and campesinos looting and pillaging the provincial capital with little regard for 
the injured still trapped beneath the rubble of their homes and businesses. Similarly, 
many descriptions of the disaster’s aftermath observed that the lower classes used the 
disaster as an opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the wealthy. 
Despite narratives of widespread disorder and chaos after the 1861 earthquake in 
Mendoza, however, an examination of the provincial judicial and criminal records shows 
a decrease in reported criminal activity. The decrease in crime could be the result of 
underreporting due to the difficulty or inability to document or record crimes in the 
weeks and months after the earthquake. Studying criminal and judicial records from 1858 
to 1864 provides a wider scope with which to compare the narratives of disorder and 
documented incidence of crime registered in the immediate months and years after the 
disaster to crime rates before the earthquake. Thefts and robberies, as well as total crime, 
decreased in 1861, the year the earthquake struck Mendoza. When robberies and thefts 
are tabulated as a percent of the total number of crimes for each year, however, 1861 and 
the years after the natural disaster reflect pre-earthquake rates. Thus, the narratives of 
disorder and elite panic prevalent in survivor accounts of the natural disaster do not 
reflect documented crime rates and levels of theft and robbery in Mendoza. Instead, 
examples of survivors working together in informal and extraordinary communities to 
provide for their basic necessities such as food, potable water, and shelter also exist 
alongside accounts of antisocial behavior. Natural disasters such as the 1861 Mendoza 
earthquake, then, provide an opportunity to view political and social tensions within a 
community and country without the everyday façade that often conceals them. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
2. The Junta de Estudios Históricos de Mendoza collected a variety of primary sources, 
including survivor accounts, newspapers, scientific reports, archival records, 
correspondence, and government documents from libraries and archives around 
Argentina that are particularly helpful in studying the 1861 earthquake. The sources 
were published in volumes 2 and 10 of the Revista de la Juna de Estudios Históricos 
de Mendoza. 
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